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ABSTRACT  
   
Libertarians affirm the right to liberty, i.e., the right to do what one wants 
free from interference. Libertarians also affirm the right to private property. One 
objection to libertarianism is that private property relations restrict liberty. This 
objection appears to have the consequence that libertarianism is an incoherent 
position. I examine Jan Narveson's version of the libertarian view and his defense 
of its coherence. Narveson understands the right to liberty as a prohibition on the 
initiation of force. I argue that if that is what the right to liberty is, then the 
enforcement of property rights violates it. I also examine Narveson’s attempt to 
support private property with his distinction between interference with and mere 
prevention of activity and argue that this distinction does not do the work that he 
needs it to do. My conclusion is that libertarianism is, in a sense, impossible 
because conceptually unsound. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the things with which political philosophers concern themselves is 
what justice requires of coercive political institutions. That is not all that political 
philosophers can or should be concerned about. Not only should we want to know 
whether or not a proposed normative requirement on coercive political institutions 
is morally persuasive, we should also like to know if it makes sense in the first 
place. That is the sense in which I intend to evaluate the plausibility of 
libertarianism in the present discussion. By the term “libertarianism,” I refer 
specifically to so-called right-libertarianism1 of the sort defended by Jan 
Narveson. Libertarians such as Narveson affirm a general right to liberty, or non-
interference, i.e., a right that others refrain from interfering with whatever non-
interfering things you want to do. The right to liberty, on this view, is the sole 
basic right that individuals have; it is, in a sense, the only right that you have. 
Libertarianism is also wedded to the belief that individuals have the right to 
private property, which is often taken to justify capitalistic property relations. If 
the right to liberty is the sole basic right that individuals have, then it would seem 
natural to suppose that private property rights are grounded by that right. This 
view is sometimes objected to on the grounds that what counts as interference is a 
function of what property rights people have, so the right to liberty cannot be non-
                                                 
1
 Right-libertarianism is distinct from the class of theories known as left-
libertarianism, which take a very different view regarding what counts as a just 
property arrangement. For more on left-libertarianism see Vallentyne. 
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circularly invoked to justify property rights (Lomasky 113). Narveson flatly 
denies this objection, believing that property rights can be justified by the right to 
liberty, and that these property rights will be private property rights 
(“Libertarianism vs. Marxism” 3). However, Narveson’s position on this matter is 
problematic. It is far from clear that accepting the right to liberty by itself 
commits one to countenancing the legitimacy of private property. In fact, if one of 
G.A. Cohen’s objections to libertarianism is correct, then it appears that 
Narveson’s libertarianism might actually be incoherent, since it suggests that the 
assertion of a right to private property contradicts the unqualified statement of a 
right to liberty, or non-interference. Cohen’s objection is that private property 
limits—or interferes with—liberty, so liberty and private property do not have the 
conceptual link that libertarians like Narveson think they do. This is rather 
surprising if it is true. For the debate about libertarianism becomes, in this 
context, not about whether it makes moral sense, but about whether it makes 
sense at all. The purpose of my inquiry is to navigate the logical geography of this 
issue, so to speak, and to assess whether some of the moves that Narveson does 
make or could make in defense of his libertarianism have any promise of 
overcoming this challenge to the coherence of his view. 
At first blush, it may look like the view that private property restricts 
liberty can be accepted without concluding that it shows that libertarianism is 
incoherent. Libertarians such as Narveson may mean something quite different by 
the terms “liberty” and “interference” than others do when they challenge 
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libertarianism in the way that I am describing. If it is to be proven that 
libertarianism does not live up to its own professions, it must be shown that 
private property limits liberty in a way ruled out by the right to liberty. In order to 
address that issue, the notion of interference needs to be fleshed out. The 
challenge for Narveson is to flesh it out in a way that makes acquisition of private 
property non-interfering and private property violations interfering. Yet it is far 
from clear that this can be achieved. I will make the case for that claim first by 
examining ways that Narveson can and does defend his position by appeal to the 
concept of force. In Chapter 4, I will try to show that these defenses do not work, 
and I will argue that conceiving of the right to liberty in terms of the concept of 
force will not do the work that Narveson needs it to do, since it will leave him 
without a clear way of explaining how property rights violations should be 
prohibited by the libertarian standard of justice. I will argue that the right to 
private property is incompatible with the right to liberty if the latter is understood 
as a prohibition on the initiation of force. That argument, if successful, would lend 
credence to the claim that libertarianism is unintelligible. In Chapter 5, I will 
consider a way that Narveson attempts to characterize the difference between 
acquiring property and violating a property right, i.e., his appeal to the distinction 
between preventing and interfering with an activity. I will argue that Narveson’s 
distinction will be unable to achieve what he wants it to, because the distinction 
itself cannot tell us whether an interference with an activity is coercive, which 
means that it cannot tell us why invasions of property should be prohibited. 
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Narveson will, as a result, have to fall back on his reliance on the concept of force 
to explain why property rights violations should be prohibited. But since I argue 
in Chapter 4 that this move simply will not work for Narveson, the failure of his 
distinction to do the desired work is quite troublesome for him. If all my 
arguments go through, then Narveson will be left with a conceptual quandary. I 
will conclude, ultimately, that private property relations restrict liberty in the very 
sense of “liberty” that the libertarian has to be committed to. Taken together, the 
points I raise in my discussion will, I think, constitute a fairly strong case against 
libertarianism as conceived of by Narveson and others of a similar mindset. 
I should emphasize that I take what I say in the ensuing discussion to 
undermine only Narveson’s particular version of libertarianism according to 
which private property rights are generated by a morally neutral conception of 
liberty. One alternative view endorses a moralized conception of liberty. 
According to that view, an act does not interfere with one’s liberty if it does not 
violate one’s rights. To be free, on that view, is to be free from interference with 
what one has the right to do. Robert Nozick accepts something along these lines. 
Nozick’s view seems to be immune to the objections I raise against Narvesonian 
libertarianism, although his view has problems of its own. I will explain why in 
the final chapter.  
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CHAPTER 2 
DEFINING LIBERTARIANISM 
I said in the preceding chapter that libertarianism—at least the sort of 
libertarianism that I will direct my arguments against—is the doctrine that the sole 
basic right that individuals have is the right to liberty. What does it mean to say 
that somebody has a right? Clearly we do not want to say that one has a right in 
exactly the same sense in which one has an arm and a leg, or a car, or a spouse. 
Part of what we seem to be asserting about a person when we say that they have a 
right of a certain sort is that a certain moral claim is true of them. More 
specifically, we seem to be saying that that person ought to be, or ought not to be, 
treated in such and such a way. To treat that person in a way ruled out by the right 
they possess would be to violate that particular right of theirs. This consideration 
suggests a further feature of rights: If a person’s possession of a right of a certain 
sort means that they ought to be, or ought not to be, treated in specified ways, 
then somebody else has a duty to treat or refrain from treating that person in the 
ways specified by their right. This idea is known as the correlativity of rights and 
duties. Another way to express the idea would be to say that claims about rights 
entail claims about duties. Given that the claim that somebody has a right of a 
certain sort entails the claim that somebody else has a duty of a certain sort, it 
makes sense to speak of a person’s right as a right against somebody else. If A 
has a right against B to do X, then B has a duty to do Y (Narveson, The 
Libertarian Idea 41-42). Upon whom does a right’s correlative duty fall? It 
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depends on the particular right under consideration and, in certain cases, who has 
that right. It may be that the duty falls upon just a single individual, or many 
individuals, or everybody. If a lender has the right to be paid back the amount of 
money, plus interest, that she loaned out to somebody, then the correlative duty to 
pay the money back, in the typical case, falls upon whoever took out the loan. If I 
have the right to say whatever I want, whenever I want, then the duty not to 
interfere with my saying whatever I want falls upon everybody.  
The right to liberty, in the libertarian’s sense of that term, is a negative 
right (Narveson, The Libertarian Idea 59), so we need to get clear on what 
negative rights are. A negative right, to put it roughly, is a right that others refrain 
from interfering with whatever it is that you have a right to do. In contrast, a 
positive right is a right to assistance or to the provision of some good(s). If I have 
only the negative right to be alive, then everybody else has the duty to refrain 
from ending my life, but they do not have the duty to assist me in staying alive or 
saving me if I am about to die. All that is required of them in order to respect my 
negative right is to refrain from interfering with my efforts to keep myself alive. 
On the other hand, if I have the positive right to be alive, it is not enough for 
others to refrain from interfering with my efforts to stay alive. In that case, others 
have the duty to do something to keep me alive. They might be required to 
provide me with the means required to sustain myself (food, healthcare, etc.), or 
they might be required to attempt to rescue me if I am about to die (perhaps, 
however, only if doing that would not impose an unacceptably high cost on them). 
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A libertarian might be thought of as someone who countenances no positive basic 
rights at all.2 The libertarian view is that the only basic right you have is the right 
not to be interfered with; you do not have a basic right to positive assistance. Let 
me be clear: The right to liberty is not to be interpreted positively. That is to say, 
the libertarian view is not that you have the right for others to assist you in 
defending against interference; it is only that you have the right that others refrain 
from interfering with your liberty. The reason for stating the view this way is that 
a positive right to protection against interference with liberty may be seen to 
conflict with a negative right to liberty. For a positive right to protection would 
license the use of force against individuals in order to provide such protection, 
and if merely refraining from the provision of such protection initiates force 
against nobody, then it looks like a positive right to protection is incompatible 
with fundamental libertarian principles.3 
I said that the right to liberty is the sole basic right countenanced by the 
libertarian view. In order to get clear on what basic rights are, it is useful to 
contrast them with legal rights. Whereas our legal rights are reflected in actually 
existing laws, regulations, and so forth, our basic rights are those rights that we 
have independently of what our legal rights are. It is possible for legal rights to 
                                                 
2
 I am speaking loosely here. The libertarian may allow for positive rights that 
arise through somebody’s voluntarily assuming an obligation toward somebody 
else, e.g. by entering into a contract. When I say that the libertarian countenances 
no positive basic rights I mean that there are no positive rights that people just 
have independently of others’ voluntarily assuming an obligation toward them. 
3
 Nozick attempts a libertarian justification of the minimal state, which 
amounts to an argument for the right to protection (54-146). 
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conflict with basic rights. At one point in U.S. history, certain persons had the 
legal right to “own” slaves, but we now think that they never had a basic right of 
ownership over persons. At the same time, certain persons, merely because of 
their race, did not have the legal right to move about freely and determine the 
course of their own lives, but we now think that they had that basic right all along. 
The right to liberty is, on the libertarian view, a right you have regardless of 
whether or not a legal system recognizes you as having that right. 
Rights, in the sense in which I am using the term, possess an especially 
powerful normative force. The duties that correlate with rights are not mere moral 
requirements; they are moral requirements of a special sort. One might think that 
A is morally required to do X for B without concluding that B is owed X as a 
matter of right. For instance, suppose that I ought to acknowledge my parents’ 
birthdays. It may be thought, consistent with my having that requirement, that my 
parents do not have the right that I acknowledge their birthdays. What is it, then, 
that accounts for the special normative force that rights seem to have? Narveson 
suggests, plausibly, that it is enforceability (The Libertarian Idea 48). According 
to this line of thinking, if A has an enforceable duty to refrain from doing X to B, 
then it is okay for A to be forced to refrain from doing X to B. A’s doing X to B, 
then, would be a violation of B’s right not to have X done to him. On this view, if 
my parents did have the right that I acknowledge their birthdays, then it would be 
permissible to force me to acknowledge their birthdays. 
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Some philosophers contend that there is a further sense in which rights 
have especially powerful normative force. The idea is often expressed by saying 
that rights are trumps, or side-constraints. To say that rights are trumps is to say 
that they override other non-right considerations. That is, when someone has a 
right, we have a reason to treat that person in certain ways or allow them the 
freedom to do certain things even if violating their right would serve some social 
aim. According to this line of thinking, when a person has a right, justifications 
from considerations of general utility to treat that person in a way ruled out by the 
right simply are not enough (Dworkin 191). A similar (equivalent?) idea is 
Nozick’s conception of rights as side-constraints. According to Nozick, rights are 
side-constraints that limit what it is permissible to do in the pursuit of goals. 
Nozick’s conception of rights as side-constraints rules out a utilitarianism of 
rights in which the non-violation of rights is a goal to be maximized even if rights 
are violated in the process of maximizing that goal. According to Nozick’s 
conception, rights are constraints on goal-directed behavior; they define the space 
of just and unjust goal-directed behavior (28-29). On this picture of rights as 
trumps, or side-constraints, rights appear to place severe limits on consequentialist 
reasoning. That is to say, rights ought to be respected even if their violation would 
lead to a better state of affairs than their non-violation, according to this line of 
thought.  
We saw that the right to liberty requires that others refrain from interfering 
with what you want to do. We need to get reasonably clear on how the term 
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“interference” is being used here. Furthermore, the expression “what you want to 
do” needs to be appropriately qualified to allow for the enforcement of the right to 
liberty.  At one end of the spectrum of putative interferences are actions that are 
clearly not interferences with one’s right to do something. If you have the right to 
say whatever you want, whenever you want, then my simply baking a cake cannot 
be construed as interfering with that particular right of yours. At another extreme 
of the spectrum are clear cases of interference. These involve clear uses of force 
against a person. Imprisoning me for saying something offensive would normally 
be considered an interference with my right to say whatever I want to say. If you 
have the right to use the public library and I push you out of the way so that you 
cannot enter, then I interfere with you in such a way that I violate your right. As 
we will see later, Narveson conceives of interference with the right to liberty as 
the use of force against persons. We shall affirm the following then: The right to 
liberty is violated only if force is used against a person. What about this notion of 
doing what you want to do? We do not want to say that the right to liberty is 
license for anybody to do absolutely anything they want to do, because then it 
would make no sense to call it a right. Rights entail restrictions on behavior, but 
the right to liberty interpreted in the way just described entails no such 
restrictions. If the right to liberty entails restrictions on behavior, then what is 
meant by the claim that individuals should be at liberty to do what they want to 
do? First, the right to liberty licenses the use of force against encroachments on 
the liberty to do what one wants. Second, encroaching on the liberty to do what 
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one wants is surely something that some people want to do. Third, such 
encroachments are conceived of as uses of force on the libertarian view. These 
considerations suggest that a distinction needs to be made between initiatory force 
and defensive, or retaliatory, force. The libertarian view may then be recast as 
follows: The right to liberty is the right not to have force initiated against oneself, 
but not the right that others refrain from defending, or retaliating, against 
initiations of force. On this view, then, individuals have the right to defend against 
unprovoked attacks. In short, individuals should be at liberty to do anything that 
does not initiate force against others. I will have more to say about initiatory force 
later on when I examine Narveson’s views in more detail. 
Before I conclude this chapter, I need to explain what property rights are 
and, in particular, what private property rights are. Two concepts appear to be 
central to the idea of a property right, namely the concepts of use and 
excludability. Ownership, it might be said, is “rightful use with power to exclude” 
(Narveson, “Property and Rights” 109). It might be more accurate to say, 
however, that ownership is rightful use with legitimate authority to exclude or, as 
Narveson says, “entitlement to use the thing oneself and to exclude others from 
using it” (“Property and Rights” 102). If I were to break into a house and kick the 
owner out by force, I might have the power to exclude the owner from the use of 
their house, but I would not be said to own the house, since I presumably would 
not have the legitimate authority to exclude others from the use of the house. At 
most I would be said to possess the house. According to my amended definition 
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of “ownership,” then, in order for A to have a property right in X, it has to be the 
case that A has the right to use X in certain ways and the legitimate authority to 
exclude others from the use of X.4  
I presume that what counts as a use of something is reasonably clear, but 
what counts as a justified use quite a bit less clear. An obvious, though not terribly 
informative, requirement of property rights is that a person’s use of their own 
property should not violate anybody else’s property rights. A bit more 
informative, perhaps, would be the libertarian requirement that the use of one’s 
own property not initiate force against anyone. The radical libertarian would 
affirm a panoply of use rights with respect to property, the list of which would 
include “deciding whether, how, or when to use it; permitting others to use it; 
consuming, modifying, or destroying it; selling, exchanging, bequeathing, or 
giving it away as a gift; and so forth” (Kekes 4). Less radical views of property 
might qualify or eliminate one or more of the listed use rights, such as the plenary 
right of an individual to destroy something they have acquired. 
What are private property rights? To put it simply, in a regime of private 
property, ownership rights attach to individuals. On this view, a single individual 
may acquire holdings, without need for the consent of a community or Central 
Committee, and alone determine the disposition of the acquired holdings. This 
does not preclude the possibility of, for instance, a number of individuals entering 
                                                 
4
 Perhaps the rights of exclusion and use are not different sorts of rights, since 
it might be said that the right to exclude is simply the right to use one’s own 
property in ways that are incompatible with others’ having access to it. 
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into a contract together to own something in common as long as nobody’s private 
property rights are violated in the process. Perhaps the libertarian would want to 
say that a number of different property arrangements are allowable, but that the 
right to private property is fundamental—that it defines the ways in which other 
ownership arrangements may permissibly come about. Essential to our 
understanding of the objection to libertarianism that I want to examine in the 
present discussion is the recognition that the rights of use and exclusion restrict 
access to property by imposing enforceable obligations on non-owners to keep off 
what they do not own. It is this fact which is pointed to by some of those who 
raise questions about libertarianism on the grounds of liberty. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND LIBERTY 
Now that we have a decent understanding of what libertarianism is and 
what its commitment to private property consists of, we are in a position to 
evaluate the charge that libertarianism countenances restrictions on liberty and 
Narveson’s defense against this charge. In several writings Cohen argues that 
private property limits liberty and that unfreedom is inherent to private property 
relations (“Capitalism” 12; “Illusions” 226-227). This is so because private 
property relations place legal constraints on the use of bits of the world. Let us 
suppose that I wish to pitch a tent in your backyard. If the state intervenes on your 
behalf, namely by preventing me from pitching the tent on your property, I will 
have been made less free (Cohen, “Illusions” 226-227). That is, I will not have 
been able to do some things that I otherwise could have done (pitching my tent on 
your property), and legitimately so, according to the libertarian’s commitment to 
private property. Libertarians like Narveson maintain that preventing me from 
doing what I want to do in cases like that is compatible with the prohibition on 
interfering with others’ liberty. Not only that, Narveson also thinks that private 
property rights are generated by the prohibition on interfering with others’ liberty 
“as a straight implication thereof” (“Social Contract” 232).  
One may be forgiven for wondering whether Cohen has not misunderstood 
what libertarians like Narveson mean to assert, and whether he wants to say that 
private property interferes with liberty in exactly the same sense in which liberty 
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is interfered with when somebody’s private property rights are violated. 
Regarding the latter question, it appears that Cohen does want to assert that. For 
consider that in one writing Cohen appears to endorse the claim that “capitalism 
is, all things considered, inimical to freedom in the very sense of ‘freedom’ in 
which . . . a person’s freedom is diminished when his private property is tampered 
with” (“Illusions” 235). Regarding the former question, it is not clear that the 
central commitment of libertarians like Narveson—the right to liberty—really is 
just a prohibition on merely making it the case that somebody cannot do what they 
wanted to do. Perhaps the way Narveson explains libertarianism sometimes 
makes it look like that is all he thinks the central commitment of libertarianism 
amounts to. In many places throughout his writings, however, he makes it 
abundantly clear that his view is a bit more subtle than that. 
Recall that I characterized the right to liberty as a prohibition on the 
initiation of force. A person is free in the libertarian’s sense to the extent that 
force is not used against them by some agent, and a person is made unfree 
unjustly if that use of force is an initiation of force. Narveson appears to concur 
with exactly this characterization. According to Narveson, libertarianism is 
“essentially the affirmation of a general right against the initiation of force and the 
use of fraud by others against any person” (“Property and Rights” 114). Now, the 
grammar of the phrase just quoted seems to suggest that it is not just the initiation 
of force that’s prohibited by libertarianism since it is pointed out that the use of 
fraud against others is also prohibited by libertarianism. I do not, however, think 
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that Narveson means to suggest that the use of fraud is prohibited for some reason 
quite apart from the prohibition on the initiation of force. For consider that in 
another fairly recent writing he characterizes libertarianism when he says merely 
that “the initiation of force is what is wrong” (“Libertarianism vs. Marxism” 4). 
Furthermore, as we will see later, one of the ways that Narveson defends against 
the charge that private property limits liberty is by maintaining that the relevant 
concern is whether people are having force initiated against them by the mere 
existence of private property relations. Thus, it is plausible to suppose that 
Narveson thinks the prohibition on the use of fraud can in some way be 
assimilated to the prohibition on the initiation of force. As a matter of fact, he 
does argue for exactly that view (“Libertarianism vs. Marxism” 35n). 
Narveson holds that all rights are rights to act. On this view, there is no 
separate right to have. Thus, a property right in X is, according to Narveson, 
analyzable as the right to do what one wants with X (“Property and Rights” 113; 
The Libertarian Idea 80). The libertarian thesis of self-ownership, that is, the right 
to do what one wishes with any part of oneself, is equivalent to the right to liberty, 
or non-interference, according to Narveson (“Libertarianism vs. Marxism” 9). 
What gets us from ownership of the self, i.e., the right to liberty, to property in 
things external to the self? The answer seems to be that many, or perhaps all, of 
our actions require the use of things external to ourselves, so a general prohibition 
on interference with liberty requires that we refrain from interfering with actions 
that involve the use of those things (Narveson, “Property and Rights” 114). But 
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that would seem partly to require that we do not steal, damage, or otherwise 
tamper with those things on Narveson’s view. For when we initiate an activity 
using various external things, and project into the future that course of action, it is 
required that those things “be here or there, in this or that condition, at those later 
times” (Narveson, “Libertarianism vs. Marxism” 11). Ownership of things outside 
the self stems from the need for the things people possess and use not to be 
interfered with (“Social Contract” 233). When one begins using, or comes into 
possession of, an unowned thing, one acquires the right to thenceforth determine 
the disposition of that thing (acquiring ownership of an unowned thing is typically 
referred to as “initial acquisition.”) Narveson supports a first-come, first-served 
rule regarding acquisition, which he defends thusly:  
The individual who occupies an area or uses a resource before 
anyone else is declared to be the owner. Other persons who arrive 
later would have to interfere with the first-comer’s use in order to 
use it themselves at this point, whereas when first-comers arrive, 
there is no one already there, and therefore no one who is then 
interfered with. (“Liberal-Conservative” 177) 
Don’t such acquisitions interfere with your right to act? After all, if I acquire X, 
and restrict your access to it, couldn’t I legitimately interfere with your ability to 
do something with X? Why should we think that my use of X, or my attempting 
to acquire it, interferes only if X is already in use? Perhaps Narveson would want 
to say that initial acquisition only prevents the future use of external things, but 
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does not interfere with anybody’s use. I will examine this idea later in the 
discussion, but first I want to examine a different line of defense available to 
Narveson. As I already pointed out, Narveson wants to flesh out the notion of 
interference by appeal to the notion of force. By fleshing out the notion of 
interference in this way, Narveson might have a way of rebutting the charge that 
private property limits liberty in a way disallowed by the right to liberty. Let us 
see how this works out for him. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE INITIATION OF FORCE 
We saw that Narveson needs to show that acquisition does not restrict 
liberty in any way that is ruled out by the right to liberty, and this defense will 
need to be an argument for the claim that acquisition does not initiate force. One 
way that he might be able to defend his position in this connection would be to 
argue in the following way: For any X, if force is used against X, then X is 
harmed. Initial acquisition, properly understood, does not harm X. Therefore, 
initial acquisition, properly understood, does not involve the use of force against 
anyone and is therefore compatible with the right to liberty. Some of the things 
Narveson says seem to indicate that he would endorse the first premise of this 
argument. For instance, he says that “we come into the world equipped with the 
right not to be harmed, not to have our liberty violated” (The Libertarian Idea 
100).5 As we have seen, to violate somebody’s liberty is to initiate force against 
them. Narveson also supplies us with an argument for the second premise. He 
maintains that acquisition of something does not involve taking anything from 
anybody since, ex hypothesi, nobody has the thing in question prior to acquisition. 
Since one does not take anything that anybody possesses in that situation, then 
acquisition is not harmful (Narveson, “Property and Rights” 109-110, 118).  
                                                 
5
 The prohibition on harm needs to be appropriately qualified. Just as we 
wouldn’t want to say that the right to liberty prohibits the restriction of the 
assailant’s liberty involved in repelling his assaulting behavior, we wouldn’t want 
to say that the prohibition on harm requires that we not inflict upon the assailant 
the harm involved in repelling him. 
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One might reasonably ask whether placing a restriction on the use of X is 
harmful to A only if A possesses X. Consider, for instance, the fact that there are 
some things one is free to use which one in no obvious sense has. I am free to use 
the public library, but I am not in possession of it. If the library were “taken” from 
me and my use of it subsequently prohibited, presumably that would be harmful 
to me. That is to say, I would be harmed in that I would no longer be able to use 
something which I was able to use before. I take it that this may be harmful to me 
even if I had never used the library in the past. In such a case, it is hard to see how 
my welfare is not reduced, assuming that access to the library is good for me. 
What principle, then, makes taking something that somebody has harmful but the 
“taking” in the case just described harmless? Of course, even if Narveson’s 
argument does not succeed, that does not prove that property acquisition violates 
the right to liberty (understood, of course, as the prohibition on the initiation of 
force against persons). In order for the claim that property acquisition is harmful 
to be shown incompatible with the right to liberty, it would have to be true that 
property acquisition involves the use of force against others. A straightforward 
way of showing that to be the case would be to argue that all instances in which 
harm to X occurred are, as a matter of necessity, instances in which force was 
used against X. If that is true, and if acquisition always harms somebody, then it 
follows that property acquisition involves the use of force against others. But the 
claim that all harms must be uses of force is not altogether intuitive. Consider the 
following case. Suppose I alone know about a shameful secret of yours. Now, 
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suppose that I reveal this secret to others. It is clear that this sort of thing can harm 
somebody. Depending on how others react, this revelation may be quite harmful 
to you indeed. Perhaps you will lose your job. Perhaps no employer in town will 
want to hire you. Perhaps many others will be unwilling to interact with you at all. 
Clearly you can be made worse off in this sort of case, but in no straightforward 
sense have I forced you to do anything. The point here is that there are cases in 
which somebody may be harmed, yet in no straightforward sense does it seem that 
force is used against the person. If it is true, then, that not all harms are uses of 
force against a person, then some independent argument for why acquisition 
involves the use of force against persons needs to be produced. 
Narveson may appeal directly to the concept force to defend his position, 
as he does when he responds to Allan Gibbard. Gibbard argues, similarly to 
Cohen, that property restricts liberty (23). In response, Narveson says:  
What is surely essential to our comparison if we are comparing x 
and y with respect to liberty, in particular, is whether those in Sx 
who have things got them by forcing others to do this or that, that 
is to say, got them by restricting the liberties of others, and whether 
their use of the things they have is to restrict the liberties of others 
. . . If Jones got a certain item without restricting anyone’s liberty 
in any way in the process, then the fact that having it entails having 
the right to prevent others from using it does not show that there is 
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now a restriction on others’ liberty which there wasn’t previously. 
(The Libertarian Idea 77-78) 
Is the response above compelling at all? The fact that X is gotten without force 
does not obviously show that a property right in X does not limit liberty or is not 
coercive. Getting X is one thing, while establishing restrictions on the use of X 
and enforcing those restrictions is quite another thing. If I come into possession of 
X while you’re going about your merry way not caring that I got X, it is still the 
case that you are in some sense made less free when restrictions on X’s use are 
established and enforced. Furthermore, using X to restrict the liberty of others 
would seem to involve restrictions beyond those which constitute my property 
right. Why think that if the particular sort of restriction mentioned by Narveson is 
absent, then there are no limits on liberty here at all? If I don’t use my net to 
capture you and make you work for me, it does not follow that my private 
ownership of the net does not in some sense limit your liberty.  
Narveson claims that “To use force is to preclude voluntary action; to 
coerce is to impede the operation of individual choice by revising the options 
available to someone without that individual’s consent” (The Libertarian Idea 
49).6 Some of the ways of revising the options of others are, according to 
Narveson, interferences with freedom when they are performed (The Libertarian 
Idea 34). Now, any action I perform trivially revises your options. If I am 
                                                 
6
 I presume that Narveson uses the terms “coercion” and “force” 
interchangeably. At any rate, I do not see any reason why he would want to do 
otherwise. 
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standing 5 feet away from you and I move back by 1 foot, I make it the case that 
you cannot now be 5 feet away from me without moving. This sort of case does 
not appear to involve the preclusion of voluntary action, since it does not appear 
to involve compelling you to do or to refrain from doing anything. Suppose, 
however, that I am a first-comer to some patch of land. Narveson would say that it 
is my right to appropriate that patch of land. My appropriation endows me with 
the right to forcibly restrict its use by others who are not there yet. That is to say, 
once I legitimately appropriate something, I am thenceforth endowed with the 
right to compel others to keep off. But suppose that others who are not there yet 
object to my appropriating that patch of land and revising their options by forcibly 
restricting their future use of it. This should be just fine on Narveson’s view as 
long as my revising the options of others does not amount to initiating force 
against them.  
We saw that to coerce is not merely to revise somebody’s options without 
their consent. When force is used against somebody, what happens appears to be 
either that the revision of their options is brought about in a certain manner or 
that at least one of the post-revision options is of a certain specific type. Suppose I 
invent a device that can control your actions remotely. Suppose that I use the 
device to make you yell “fire!” in a crowded theater in which you are sitting at the 
moment. In that case, I revise your options in such a way that your only option is 
to yell “fire!” and the specific way in which I make that your only option is by 
compelling you with my device. Or suppose that you are trying to enter a building 
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and I thwart your attempts by pushing you out of the way. I make it the case that 
you do not enter the building, and I bring this state of affairs about by applying 
physical force to your body. Let us call these cases instances of direct force. In 
such cases, I bring it about that you cannot do other than what I compel you to do 
by actually applying force against you or some part of you. These are 
paradigmatic examples of coercion, and one thing that is common to such cases is 
that they involve doing something to somebody else by manipulating a part or 
parts of them, i.e., their body. These cases do not simply involve the manipulation 
of things external to the person being coerced. Now consider a case in which the 
state threatens you by declaring that if you do not hand over 30% of this month’s 
income, you will be hauled off to jail. Let us call this case an instance of indirect 
force. In this sort of case your options are revised in such a way that your post-
revision options include having direct force employed against you should you fail 
to abide by the threat. Indirect force does not involve the application of direct 
force against an individual. Rather, it is, as I have said, a threat (or, a declaration, 
if one prefers that term). It is force in a derivative sense, since one applies indirect 
force to another by making it the case that if a threat is not abided by, then direct 
force will be employed. The existence of a legal system for the enforcement of 
property rights compels potential violators of property rights indirectly through 
the threat to employ direct force against them, and the actual enforcement of legal 
rules of property involves employing direct force against violators. Whether this 
involves initiatory force will be discussed below. 
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With the above conception of force in hand, we can now see exactly how 
Narveson may defend the legitimacy of private property on libertarian grounds. 
Recall that Narveson maintained, in response to Gibbard, that if we want to know 
if private property restricts liberty, we need to know if the people who own things 
got what they own by forcing others to do this or that. But, Narveson might say, 
since merely coming into possession of something does not involve the direct or 
indirect application of force against anybody, then acquisition does not restrict 
liberty. Thus, private property does not necessarily restrict liberty. I have already 
pointed out the difficulty with Narveson’s response to Gibbard, but let us grant 
him this premise: Merely coming to possess something does not involve using 
force against anybody. For it does not involve doing anything to anybody the way 
direct force does, nor does it involve a threat to anybody, so it cannot be indirect 
force either. At most it involves doing something to things external to other 
individuals. But even if we grant Narveson this premise, he is not out of the 
woods yet. Defending private property in the way just described would leave 
Narveson without a clear way of saying how property rights violations are unjust 
by libertarian standards. According to the characterization of force given above, 
property rights violations are not essentially uses of direct or indirect force against 
anybody, the reasons for which will be given below. This fact is problematic for 
the libertarian, because non-coercive actions are not prohibited by the right to 
liberty. 
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The libertarian is committed to the legitimacy of private property and 
holds that the sole basic right that individuals have is the right to liberty. 
Violations of property rights are violations of the right to liberty on this view. If 
the right to liberty is interpreted as a prohibition on the initiation of force, then 
property rights violations have to be initiations of force in order to be disallowed 
by the libertarian’s central commitment of justice. Part of the libertarian’s 
objection to the state on the grounds of liberty is precisely that much of what the 
state does violates individual private property rights. In arrogating to itself the 
right to dispose of its citizens’ holdings without their consent, the state violates 
the liberty of its citizens—citizens who do not initiate force against anybody 
simply by owning things. But the libertarian cannot rely solely on the claim that 
the state engages in this sort of behavior to show that the state violates the right to 
liberty; more than that is needed. What we need to know is whether or not acts of 
stealing, intruding upon, or otherwise tampering with property coerce property 
owners. For if property rights violations are not coercive by their very nature, then 
on what grounds can the libertarian endorse a prohibition on such violations?  
As we have seen, the libertarian view, properly understood, does not 
disallow threats of force per se, nor does it disallow the use of direct force. What 
the libertarian view disallows are uses of indirect and direct force that amount to 
initiations of force. The libertarian’s preferred sense of “initiation of force” 
should not entail that a threat to use force against potential rights violators counts 
as an initiation of force simply because such a threat occurs prior to any violation. 
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If it did, then proposals to defend one’s rights would be disallowed by the right to 
liberty. Such threats, then, have to be considered by the libertarian to be mere 
proposals to defend against initiations of force rather than themselves being 
initiations of force. Thus, we do not know whether the state, or any other potential 
property rights violator, violates the right to liberty simply by observing that they 
threaten to coerce currently peaceful property owners. Nor do we know whether 
or not property rights violators violate the right to liberty simply by the 
observation that they employ direct force against those who defend against 
invasions of property. For the question here is whether or not those who defend 
against invasions of property are themselves initiating force. If property rights 
violations are not by their very nature uses of force, then such violations should 
be perfectly alright according to the libertarian’s own professed commitment. As 
we have seen, the libertarian’s commitment is that “the only purpose for which 
(coercive) force may properly be used against people is to counter the aggressive 
use of force by those people against yet other people, if the latter are not 
themselves aggressors” (Narveson, “Libertarianism vs. Marxism” 4).7  
In order to determine whether or not those who enforce property rights 
engage in initiatory force, we need to isolate what property rights violations 
essentially are. Let us consider some cases. Suppose that I break into your house 
while you are at work and make off with your television without your consent. 
                                                 
7
 Once again, I presume that Narveson treats “coercion” and “force” as 
synonymous, and it’s not clear why he would want to do otherwise. Thus, it’s not 
clear what is supposed to be meant by “(coercive) force” as opposed to simply 
“force.” 
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Next, consider a case in which I decide to take an afternoon nap on your front 
lawn even though you object to that. Lastly, imagine a case in which I throw a 
rock through one of the windows of your house, thereby destroying your window. 
These acts—theft, trespass, and destruction—are as clearly in violation of 
property rights as any, I think, so the libertarian cannot maintain that a violation 
of a property right has to involve the sort of activity that the state engages in, e.g., 
threatening to use direct force against you if you do not give up what you have 
acquired. Furthermore, the libertarian cannot simply assume that what occur in 
the cases under consideration are acts of direct force against the property-holder; 
that has to be argued for. So do the cases under consideration involve acts of 
direct force against the property-holder? Clearly they do not, since to use direct 
force against somebody involves doing something to them. All that I do in the 
above cases is something to something that you purportedly own. These 
considerations suggest that force as I have characterized it is not essential to our 
idea of what it is to violate a property right.8 What, then, makes it the case that a 
violation of your property rights necessarily involves the use of force against you? 
The libertarian might object at this point by claiming that when I engage in the 
acts described above, I make it impossible for you to do things that you wanted to 
do; I force you to do something else by manipulating these things around you – 
                                                 
8
 Some actions performed upon external objects seem hard to separate 
conceptually from actions performed upon persons’ bodies. For instance, the thief 
who wants to steal the coat that somebody is wearing has to do something to the 
victim’s body to get it. This fact would not show that the right to liberty grounds 
full-blooded property rights; it would only show that it grounds extremely limited 
use rights. 
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things that you purportedly own. Perhaps I make it impossible for you to come 
home and enjoy your television, or to determine the disposition of your lawn such 
that I do not take a nap on it, or to sit next to where your window was without the 
wind hitting your face. However, this reply is problematic, because when I simply 
appropriate private property, I make it impossible for other people to do things 
that they may have wanted to do. Suppose that there is an unowned tree on which 
you wish to climb. Suppose that before you get a chance to climb on this tree, I 
appropriate it by cutting it down and turning it into a canoe. Obviously, in this 
situation, I make it impossible for you to do something that you wanted to do. If 
the libertarian wants to maintain that property rights violations are coercive in the 
sense described above, it is hard to see how private property rights could get off 
the ground in the first place, since appropriation appears to be coercive in the 
same sense. Moreover, if merely violating a property right is not coercive, then 
the enforcement of private property rights initiates force against those who choose 
to merely violate private property rights. The state’s threats to use direct force 
against those who defend private property claims are presumably, then, just 
proposals to defend against coercive interference with non-coercive behavior. In 
defending acquisition and possession by appealing to the concept of force, 
Narveson ends up with the result that the enforcement of property rights initiates 
force, thereby violating the right to liberty. These considerations reinforce a point 
I made earlier: Showing that getting X occurred without the use of force does not 
show that defending a property right in X does not initiate force. Critics of 
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libertarianism such as Cohen and Gibbard do not need the claim that coming to 
possess something initiates force in order to make their case. All they need to 
show is that property rights violations do not count as uses of force against the 
right-holder and that the enforcement of property rights is coercive. 
Now, there is an obvious move one can make in response to all of this, 
which would be to say that property rights are assimilable to body rights. On that 
view, a violation of a property right would count as a violation of a body right. 
This response is significant because my conclusion that property rights violations 
do not necessarily violate the right to liberty and that the enforcement of property 
rights involves initiatory force relies partly on the claim that property rights 
violations need not involve doing anything to any part of anyone. An argument 
for the assimilation of property rights to body rights would involve the denial of 
that claim. Samuel C. Wheeler III makes this sort of argument. He argues that 
there is no line between what counts as one’s property and what counts as a part 
of one’s body and that, for instance, to coerce the owner of the world’s food 
supply to part with any of his food is “on a par with taking the flesh of the only 
robust person against his will to feed the starving” (181, 186). Although I won’t 
get into how Wheeler arrives at these conclusions, it is worth emphasizing how 
strong these claims are. The argument is not—indeed, can’t be—merely that the 
various items of “external” property are body parts and belong to somebody. For 
if I were to amputate my arm and preserve it, it would still be a body part, and if I 
owned it, it would be my body part. But after it is amputated it is not, one would 
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think, a part of me; the arm is at that point external to me. If the claim being 
argued for is only that items of “external” property are body parts in this rather 
weak sense, then my conclusion stands: violating a property right need not 
involve doing anything to any part of anyone. So the claim being argued for needs 
to be the stronger one that items of “external” property are parts of somebody or 
other just as my currently attached arm is a part of me. If that conclusion were 
true, then such things as houses, cars, food supplies, and so on, would count as 
parts of somebody or other in this strong sense if they were owned. Anybody who 
wants to argue for the assimilability of property rights in the whole cornucopia of 
things that may be considered property to body rights will have to accept such a 
conclusion. This conclusion, however, is remarkably counterintuitive. It may even 
be thought that its counterintuitiveness is a strong enough reason to reject any 
argument that purports to assimilate property rights to body rights. 
Another, less counterintuitive move available to Narveson is one that I 
alluded to earlier. Narveson can claim that violations of property rights upset 
activities that are already in train, whereas merely acquiring property does no 
such thing. Although Narveson does not, as far as I can tell, advance this view as 
a response to the particular objections that I raised above, he does advance it as a 
way of showing why property rights violations should be prohibited. This 
suggests that the view just mentioned may be a way of rebutting the objections I 
have raised so far. I will evaluate the strength of this view in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
INTERFERENCE AND PREVENTION 
Narveson may attempt to rebut what I argued in the previous chapter by 
appealing to the distinction between merely preventing an activity and interfering 
with an activity. Narveson maintains that the reason that first-comers have the 
right to what they appropriate is that meddlesome second-comers “would then be 
interfering with the courses of action initiated and being continued by those first-
comers” (“Libertarianism vs. Marxism” 11). Presumably, then, the relevant 
difference between violating a property right and acquiring property is that the 
former interferes with courses of action already underway, whereas the latter 
merely prevents courses of action not yet initiated (Cohen, “Once More” 62). On 
this view, interference is a kind of prevention. Interference prevents the 
continuation of an activity already underway (or at least the undisturbed 
continuation of an activity), whereas mere prevention prevents an activity from 
being initiated in the first place. It is fairly easy to see why this is a natural move 
for Narveson to make. After all, when you legitimately appropriate, there is, ex 
hypothesi, nobody there doing anything for you to interfere with by appropriating. 
On the other hand, the thief goes there, where you have this stuff that you own, 
and takes some of it, thereby interfering with whatever activity you were using 
your stuff to engage in. This distinction addresses a concern I raised in the last 
chapter, i.e., the concern that the libertarian cannot consistently endorse both a 
prohibition on the way that property rights violators thwart the ambitions of their 
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victims and the liberty of those who appropriate to thwart the ambitions of non-
appropriators. I do not think this distinction works for Narveson’s purposes.9 The 
reasons for that will be presented below. 
We begin by observing that many activities are decomposable in the sense 
that they contain other activities as components. For instance, building a house 
contains as its component activities: laying the foundation, building the roof, 
installing the windows, and so on. Since activities are decomposable in this way, a 
mere prevention of one activity may thereby interfere with another activity of 
which it is a component. Suppose that you acquire an item and begin using it to 
perform activity A. A consists of sub-activities A1 and A2. You initiate A by 
performing A1. I come in and do X, which merely prevents you from performing 
A2. By merely preventing A2 I interfere with A, because now you cannot 
complete A. Do we prohibit X because it interferes with A, or do we allow it 
because it merely prevents A2? Since X is an act which exemplifies both 
interference and mere prevention, we need a criterion independent of the 
distinction itself for assigning priority to the choice of prohibiting X. Narveson 
may reply that there is no real problem here. He may answer that X ought to be 
prohibited simply because it interferes with A. After all, interference is exactly 
what he thinks ought to be prohibited; he is not committed to the claim that mere 
                                                 
9
 Cohen agrees that the distinction doesn’t work for Narveson’s purposes, but 
for different reasons than the ones I adduce here. Cohen’s view is that Narveson 
needs an acceptable standard for individuating activities, but that no standard 
available to him satisfies that requirement. The standards available to Narveson 
are either absurdly generous, absurdly restrictive, or totally arbitrary (Cohen, 
“Once More” 64-66). 
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prevention of one activity is allowable when it interferes with another activity. 
Narveson is committed only to the claim that mere prevention of one activity is 
allowable only if some other activity is not thereby interfered with. But it is hard 
to see how this reply is satisfactory. We must not allow ourselves to be confused 
by the use of the term “interference” here. We can certainly rephrase Narveson’s 
view by saying something like “Merely preventing an activity is allowable, but 
interrupting an activity is not.” The question we need to ask, then, is this: Is a 
prohibition on interrupting activities supported by specifically libertarian 
premises? That is to say, does interrupting an activity count as interference in a 
sense of “interference” that the libertarian has to be committed to? Per the 
libertarian’s standard of justice, the way to answer this would be to determine 
whether or not X is coercive. It seems perfectly intelligible to ask whether an 
activity was interrupted coercively or non-coercively. We cannot answer this 
question by appealing to the distinction between interference and mere 
prevention, because the question we’re asking concerns what interference with an 
activity is. Thus, the distinction between interference and mere prevention of an 
activity is not by itself able to tell us whether an act should be prohibited on 
libertarian grounds. 
So are some interferences with activity non-coercive? Consider the 
following scenario. Suppose that you appropriate some trees and begin the 
activity of building a cabin, but only get halfway done because there aren’t 
enough trees in your neck of the woods. Let us suppose that where I’m at stands 
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the only unappropriated group of trees that are left. Suppose that I decide to 
appropriate these trees for a boat-building activity I wish to engage in. By 
appropriating these trees I interfere with your cabin-building project, since I bring 
it about that you cannot complete the project. Do I use force against you in this 
scenario? I do not, according to the way I characterized force in the previous 
chapter. Consider, for instance, that if I had physically restrained you, I would 
have applied direct force to you, and that if I had threatened to physically restrain 
you, I would have applied indirect force to you. However, I do no such thing in 
the case at hand. All that I do is manipulate some objects external to you. Nor do I 
coerce you by Narveson’s professed standards, since he holds that appropriating 
hitherto unappropriated stuff does not violate the right to liberty. So it looks like 
there are good reasons to think that there is a distinction between coercive and 
non-coercive interference with activity. If Narveson accepts this distinction, as I 
think he should, then he cannot adduce his distinction between prevention and 
interference to show why property rights violations should be prohibited. For to 
merely be told that an act interferes with an activity is not enough for us to know 
if that act is coercive, and to know whether something violates a property right, 
and hence the right to liberty, requires knowing if it initiates force.  
With the above in mind, I can see only two options available to Narveson. 
Firstly, he can try to resist my claim that there is a distinction between coercive 
and non-coercive interference with activity and argue that all interference with 
activity is coercive. If he takes that route, then he owes us an explanation as to 
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how I initiate force in the scenario described above given that he thinks simple 
appropriation is non-coercive. Moreover, on that view, many initial acquisitions 
that we may have thought were legitimate on libertarian grounds would turn out 
to be coercive, since in a situation of competition for scarce resources, the 
appropriation of some resources will frustrate the activities of others. Secondly, 
Narveson can agree to my distinction yet continue to maintain that his distinction 
between prevention and interference supports property rights. But if that is the 
case, then either he cannot appeal solely to the right to liberty to support property 
rights, or the right to liberty is quite different from how he characterizes it. That 
would presumably commit Narveson to a view the consequences of which would 
look quite different from anything recognizably libertarian. On the other hand, 
Narveson could reject the claim that his distinction supports property rights, but 
then it looks like he would have to fall back on appealing directly to the notion of 
force to support the prohibition on invasions of property. As I argued in the 
previous chapter, that move will not work for him. All of the options available to 
Narveson at this point strike me as unacceptable for him. 
37 
 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued that Narveson’s libertarianism is seriously inadequate 
conceptually. In Chapter 4, I argued that Narveson’s defense of private property 
by appeal to the concept of force does not work. I argued that, if the right to 
liberty is understood as a prohibition on initiatory force, then property rights 
cannot be supported on libertarian grounds, since property rights violations are 
not essentially coercive. As a result, the enforcement of property rights restricts 
liberty in precisely the way that is prohibited by the right to liberty. In Chapter 5, I 
evaluated Narveson’s view that the distinction between interference with activity 
and mere prevention of activity supports property rights. We saw that this 
distinction alone cannot motivate a prohibition on invasions of property on 
libertarian grounds, because we must distinguish between coercive and non-
coercive interference with activity. If Narveson accepts this distinction, then he 
either has to return to a direct appeal to the concept of force to explain why 
property rights violations should be prohibited or he has to significantly revise his 
fundamental commitment of justice. As I argue in Chapter 4, the former option 
will not work for him. 
Libertarianism’s exaltation of freedom is morally appealing on the face of 
it, and appeals to liberty in the public sphere often make for dazzling rhetoric, but 
libertarianism cannot get off the ground as a serious normative proposal if it 
doesn’t make sense to begin with. Perhaps there are better ways of defending 
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libertarianism that are available to Narveson, but I do not know what those would 
be. I conclude with some circumspection, then, that the variety of libertarianism 
advocated by Narveson fails to work at a very basic level.  
As I pointed out in the first chapter, none of what I am saying seems to 
undermine all versions of right-libertarianism. Nozick, for example, might reply 
that the enforcement of private property rights is not coercive since it violates 
nobody’s rights (assuming, of course, that there are private property rights). 
Nozick does in fact appear to accept something like this line of reasoning (262-
263). If what counts as coercion depends on what rights people have, and if the 
enforcement of private property rights violates nobody’s rights, then, contrary to 
what I have been maintaining, the enforcement of private property rights is not 
coercive. If enforcing a private property right does not amount to a use of force, 
then it most certainly does not initiate force. On this view, then, the enforcement 
of private property rights does not violate the right to liberty as I have defined it. 
One problem with this view is that it entails that the justly imprisoned criminal is 
not forced to be in prison.10 Another problem is that this version of libertarianism 
seems to lack some of the attraction that versions based on morally neutral 
conceptions of liberty and coercion possess if part of attraction of the latter is the 
prohibition on initiations of force in the morally neutral sense. Depending on what 
rights people have, a Nozickian type of libertarianism might justify pervasive 
initiations of force in the morally neutral sense. Then again, if the enforcement of 
                                                 
10
 Cohen offers an objection along these lines (“Illusions” 228). 
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private property rights initiates force in the morally neutral sense, then even 
Narvesonian libertarianism endorses pervasive initiations of force against 
individuals.  
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